US-Iran: The Fight for Hormuz Enters a More Dangerous Phase

The June 17 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has effectively collapsed, leaving both Iran and the United States focused on establishing control over the strategic environment in and around the Strait of Hormuz. The deeper dispute, however, concerns who has the authority to regulate the strait. Iran began increasing attacks on vessels after the United States sought to establish a southern route through Omani territorial waters that would operate beyond Iranian control. Tehran views that route as an attempt to strip it of the leverage gained during the conflict.

Iran does not need to close Hormuz completely to achieve its objectives. Selective attacks, route restrictions, insurance increases, and uncertainty are sufficient to reduce traffic and impose costs on global markets. 

The US is seeking to restore deterrence by trying to convince Tehran that continued attacks on commercial shipping and US interests will impose unacceptable military and economic costs.  The July 11 attack on the GFS Galaxy triggered the most extensive US strikes since the June ceasefire framework. President Donald Trump then announced the return of the blockade on Iranian shipping and threatened further attacks.

The objective is to impose enough military and economic pain to force Iran back into negotiations on US terms. Iran, however, remains defiant and appears to believe that it can absorb greater costs than Washington can sustain politically or economically. 

In recent days, Iran has claimed attacks against US facilities or equipment in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman’s Port of Duqm. The July 13 attack on Emirati tankers in Omani waters represents a serious escalation. It demonstrates that Tehran is willing to target the commercial assets of Gulf states even while avoiding direct strikes on their territory.

If US military operations intensify, Iran will likely again widen attacks against commercial and critical infrastructure across the Gulf to increase economic pressure while for now avoiding actions that might unify Gulf states militarily against Tehran.  

The internationally recognized Yemeni government said the July 13 strike on Sana’a International Airport was intended to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. The Al-Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia and responded with missile and drone attacks against Abha International Airport. The exchange ended a prolonged period of relative restraint between Saudi Arabia and the Al-Houthis. The renewed military exchange signals that the Yemen theater has become a complementary front in the broader US-Iran confrontation, creating additional pressure on regional shipping and Gulf security while complicating efforts to contain the conflict to the Strait of Hormuz.

The Al-Houthis may expand attacks against Saudi aviation and energy infrastructure and could renew operations near Bab al-Mandab. Iran will almost certainly benefit from simultaneous pressure on Hormuz and the Red Sea. 

The most dangerous escalatory triggers are the death of US personnel, US attacks on senior Iranian military or political leaders, a prolonged effort to halt shipping, a major strike on Gulf infrastructure, or Israeli re-entry into the campaign. Any of these could shift the conflict from calibrated pressure to a broader regional war.

A workable off-ramp would require several linked steps: an immediate pause in attacks on commercial vessels and US strikes tied to maritime incidents; an Oman-led mechanism to verify safe passage through designated shipping lanes; suspension of competing US and Iranian toll or permit systems; limited sanctions relief tied to compliance; and reciprocal guarantees that Gulf territory will not be used for attacks on Iran and that Iran will not target host states. A separate Saudi-Al-Houthi de-escalation channel will also likely be necessary to prevent the Red Sea front from merging with the Hormuz confrontation. 

Further US strikes and Iranian retaliation are likely through at least the next 72 hours, with shipping, aviation, and energy operations across the Gulf remaining exposed to sudden disruption in the days ahead. Neither Washington nor Tehran appears to want an unrestricted regional war. Both, however, increasingly view escalation as necessary to avoid appearing weak and to gain bargaining power. This makes miscalculation, not deliberate strategic choice, the most likely path to a wider conflict.

Until the two sides reach an arrangement over who can secure, monitor, and regulate traffic through Hormuz, the current intense military clashes will remain more likely than a durable ceasefire.

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