Venezuela Earthquake Response Raises Risk of Political Unrest and Business Disruption

Although the June 24 earthquakes in Venezuela created an immediate humanitarian emergency, the government’s response is likely to prove far more consequential over the longer term. Early indications suggest the recovery efforts are becoming a test of state competence and political legitimacy that could reshape Venezuela’s domestic political environment for months, if not years, to come. The twin temblors have left thousands of people dead and tens of thousands of others homeless, especially in La Guaira State, stretching limited domestic recovery resources even with the swift and ongoing global humanitarian response.  

A Political Tinderbox

The earthquakes struck Venezuela at a moment of notable political fragility. Although interim President Delcy Rodríguez entered office with limited political capital following President Nicolás Maduro’s swift removal by the US, the government’s increasingly ineffective disaster response is now concentrating existing grievances around a single, highly visible failure of governance. While most Venezuelans are currently consumed with either the daily struggle to survive in the aftermath of the earthquake or the urgent need to help those who have been affected, resentment toward the administration is likely to grow. Across La Guaira State, Venezuelans have pointed to the remarkable solidarity that has emerged since the earthquakes, with citizens at home and abroad mobilizing to provide support where they can. That community-led response stands in sharp contrast to what many view as the government’s lackluster handling of the crisis.

The Failures of Government

Early shortcomings in the government’s earthquake recovery effort are likely to deepen the loss of public confidence and reinforce doubts about its ability to govern. The crisis has exposed the continued breakdown of Venezuela’s social contract, with the state struggling to protect and assist citizens during a national emergency. That failure reflects the long-term weakening of institutions after more than a quarter century of corruption, mismanagement, and chronic underinvestment. The documented failures of the government response in the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes include:

Understaffed and under-resourced hospitals, medical centers, and morgues;

Poor coordination of humanitarian relief and aid distribution; and

Widespread corruption by security officials, including both police and the armed forces, with documented reports of personnel:

• Soliciting bribes to permit volunteer access to disaster sites;
• Demanding payments to move rescue equipment;
• Extorting families seeking access to morgues;
• Refusing to assist with rescue and recovery operations; and
• Looting homes and victims’ belongings.

The Political Consequences

Credible international polls show that approximately 65 percent of Venezuelans disapprove of the government's handling of the current crisis, with 60 percent of respondents rating the response of the authorities as either bad or very bad. More specifically, the same polls show that Venezuelans overwhelmingly disapprove of the National Assembly, the military, Rodríguez, and the police forces, all by similarly wide margins.

For the time being, the political opposition, led by Nobel laureate María Corina Machado from Panama, has refrained from calling for street protests or other public demonstrations, recognizing both the country’s immediate needs and the poor political optics of mobilizing while recovery efforts are still underway. Should Machado successfully return from Panama, she would likely reemerge as a central figure around whom political opposition to Rodríguez would coalesce.  

Beyond polling and opposition activity, a growing willingness among ordinary Venezuelans to publicly criticize the government suggests that the climate of fear that has long constrained political dissent is beginning to weaken. Reporting and social media videos clearly underscore the depth of anti-government sentiment among many residents of Caracas and La Guaira State and, crucially, suggest that they are no longer afraid to openly express such criticism.

The Dilemma for Washington

The government’s deteriorating political position is likely to create difficult policy choices for Washington, as continued support for Rodríguez becomes harder to reconcile with growing public dissatisfaction and the prospect of widespread unrest. The Trump administration’s decision to remove Maduro from power and support Rodríguez was based, in part, on the assumption that her government would provide a more stable and legitimate alternative. The government’s ineffective earthquake response is placing that assumption under increasing strain, with public frustration extending beyond Rodríguez to her principal international backer

While many Venezuelans recognize the humanitarian aid Washington has provided, reporting suggests resentment is growing over the US’s continued control of oil revenue funds and the perception that it has not done enough to push Rodríguez toward a more comprehensive recovery response.

Should protest activity in Venezuela increase over the coming months, the Trump administration may begin to see Rodríguez less as a stabilizing partner and more as a political liability. If the US response to Tehran’s heavy-handed crackdown on the January 2026 protests across Iran is any guide, Trump is unlikely to tolerate any attempt by Rodríguez to employ similarly repressive tactics should widespread protests materialize in Venezuela.

US pressure on Rodríguez to exercise restraint could, in turn, further embolden demonstrators by reinforcing perceptions that the government has fewer options for repression than in previous years. As a result, should sustained protests materialize, the US would likely face a set of political dilemmas over whether to back the protesters, the political opposition, Rodríguez and her administration, or some combination of the three. 

For businesses considering new or renewed operations in Venezuela, the earthquakes have transformed an already challenging operating environment into one characterized by greater logistical disruption, political uncertainty, and security risk.

In the short term, the fallout from the earthquakes will affect traveler logistics, complicating travel to Caracas and increasing its risk. As long as Maiquetía Simón Bolívar International Airport (CCS)—the civilian airport that serves Caracas but is in La Guaira—remains closed, travelers will likely need to fly to Valencia and then make the multihour drive to Caracas.

However, highway robbery remains a very serious risk throughout Venezuela, especially at night. This new route will increase overall travel risk, complicate travel itineraries, and require additional mitigation measures to ensure traveler safety.

Over the medium term, there are likely to be ongoing risks to business logistics, as the bridges and tunnels along the Caracas-La Guaira highway have shown signs of strain, though officials continue to claim that these critical pieces of infrastructure remain safe to use. Additionally, operations at the Port of La Guaira, the main commercial port servicing Caracas, remain suspended due to extensive damage.

Consequently, cargo is being rerouted through either Puerto Cabello or Guanta, forcing longer, more dangerous, and more expensive overland transportation routes. It remains unclear when either CCS or the Port of La Guaira will reopen and at what capacity.

Should either of these remain inoperable for an extended period, or should the Caracas-La Guaira highway even partially close, the effects on business logistics would be significant.

What to Watch

The possibility of nationwide street protests—most likely denouncing Rodríguez and her administration but potentially also the US—will continue to pose a risk to businesses looking to reengage in the country. Depending on the government’s response to such protests, the disruptions to business operations could be both severe and widespread across the country. It is likely that the risk of such protests occurring will remain over the medium to long term. Triggers to watch for that may signal such protests are imminent could include:

• The arrival of Machado in Venezuela;
• A public call for protests by Machado or the broader political opposition;
• Mounting grassroots calls on social media for political mobilization;
• Violent confrontations between small groups of protesters and the security services; and
• Violent confrontations between displaced persons in La Guaira and the security services. 

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