Hungary’s Election Result Moves Budapest Closer to Brussels

Hungary’s April 13 election represents an inflection point in the country’s political trajectory, with the defeat of long-serving Prime Minister Viktor Orban signaling a shift away from a governance model that has frequently put Budapest at odds with broader EU norms. Peter Magyar, elected by an overwhelming margin as Hungary’s Prime Minister entered office with a mandate that suggests broad public support for closer alignment with the European Union’s policy agenda around Ukraine. Since its EU accession in 2004, Hungary’s positioning as both an EU member and a pragmatic partner to Vladimir Putin has complicated bloc cohesion, particularly regarding EU military support for Ukraine.  

Magyar’s Tisza Party, which secured a two-thirds supermajority, is also capable of making constitutional changes to undue Orban policies that previously put Budapest in poor standing for EU aid. Hungary’s closer alignment with Brussels will likely generate both political credibility and financial benefits for the new government. As much as EUR 35 billion in EU funds, some earmarked for Ukraine and others for Hungary itself, may be unfrozen as a result of Hungary’s new government. On goodwill alone, Hungary may benefit institutionally if it unblocks Ukraine’s loan immediately, an action that Magyar has promised to take. By cooperating with the broader EU agenda against Russian influence, Budapest is poised to earn credit among EU members. 

While Magyar has campaigned as an anti-establishment candidate, there are several ways in which his election is unlikely to change the business environment in Hungary. 

• Russian Energy Dependence. While Hungary has elected a pro-EU government, its structural dependency on Russian oil imports will likely mean that changes to Hungary’s Russian oil consumption will be politically difficult and logistically expensive to implement. As it was a key policy point of Magyar’s campaign to end Russian energy imports by 2035, Hungary will likely reduce its consumption of Russian energy in the long term; however, Hungary will likely still stand against the EU’s move to end all Russian oil and gas imports by 2027.
• Social Conservatism. Peter Magyar and Victor Orban are both conservative and nationalist leaders whose social policies seek to limit asylum seeker inflows as they pertain to EU policy. In terms of LGBTQ policy, Magyar is also unlikely to make immediate changes to legalize same-sex marriage or specifically protect LGBTQ demonstrations. As he has not exercised his platform on gender and sexuality issues, it is unlikely Magyar will sacrifice his sensitive political majority, which must pass a litany of reforms to receive EU funds, on an issue that remains highly controversial in Hungary.
• EU Expansion Limits. Hungary’s new government will not support Ukrainian EU membership, which was also opposed Orban and the Fidesz government. Magyar will likely support the same terms agreed to by Orban in December 2025, which were to support the EU’s loan package but refrain from individual Hungarian participation. In the event of escalation in the Russia Ukraine conflict, it cannot be ruled out that Budapest will again object to Ukrainian support and intervention. 

Hungary is likely to remain a higher-priority target of disinformation campaigns aimed at amplifying political division and unrest even as the election dust settles. However, declining public receptivity to such narratives since the start of Russia’s conflict in Ukraine are likely to limit downstream effectiveness. Disinformation and subsequent internal unrest would align with a broader pattern attributed to Moscow-linked information operations, which have historically introduced narratives before, during, and after elections in Europe to undermine trust in electoral outcomes, particularly those in politically sensitive or geopolitically significant places.

Hungary is expected to see dissent following Magyar’s victory and incoming changes to Hungary’s EU policy, and events such as protests may occur during the power transition. However, such activity, furthered by allegations of foreign influence, will likely remain limited in scale compared to a scenario in which Orban contested the results or claimed victory. 

In the short term, Hungary is likely to see an increase in external trust and investment from European partners and private actors. Magyar has a strong incentive to implement his promises of rule-of-law and anti-corruption reforms, as they are the key to unlocking EU financial support. Liberalization measures to strengthen rule of law, even if initially slow, will in turn enhance Hungary’s perception as a liberalized state, which is likely to attract new investment opportunities.

Civil unrest and social divisions in the aftermath of the election, while expected, are not likely to be effective in undoing Magyar’s majority in government. It is likely that Moscow will attempt to strengthen the already existing narrative of Ukrainian meddling in Hungary’s election; however, such narratives are unlikely to receive the necessary traction to generate legitimate instability in Hungary. Instead, the country will gain more institutional trust than it loses.

Finally, Hungary observers should note that while largely disagreeing on their foreign policies, Magyar and Orban do retain some commonalities in their policy goals and structural constraints. Despite political will, Magyar will not be able to make groundbreaking changes to Hungary’s energy security in the near term, as the country maintains strong infrastructural ties to Moscow in terms of gas and oil imports. 

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