International Intervention in Mali Unlikely Despite Increasing Militant Pressure on Bamako

The forces participating in the militant jihadist blockade around Bamako, led by groups such as al-Qaeda affiliate Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) and Katiba Macina, are unlikely to face Mali’s primary security partner Russia in direct large-scale conflict. Since the military government under General Assimi Goita came to power in 2021, it has aligned with Russia. Nevertheless, despite years of partnership, Russia lacks the capability of quickly deploying forces into Mali. While Moscow provides arms, equipment, and some training assistance, most of its direct support comes from the Africa Corps paramilitary group. Africa Corps primarily assists Bamako in security operations in support of the Malian military (FAMa), but they also play a key role in securing mineral resources, including gold mines.

Former traditional security partners, such as the US and France, are also unlikely to offer support after being forced out of the country by Goita’s junta. Rising anti-western sentiment within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has seen both the US and France lose access to military bases in the Sahel and wider West Africa. If Goita were to ask for assistance, Western nations have limited options to deploy forces into the region.  

Regional forces, particularly those from Burkina Faso and Niger through the United Forces-Alliance of Sahel States (UF-AES), have greater ability to rapidly deploy to Bamako but both countries are facing elevated jihadist threats. It is unclear how many troops they would be able or willing to deploy into Mali without sacrificing their own internal security. Despite months of blockades, large-scale UF-AES deployment has failed to materialize, highlighting the challenges of mobilizing as a regional security force.  

An attempt by JNIM to capture and govern Bamako would present the most likely trigger for unilateral international interventions, albeit being the least likely scenario. This would almost certainly push a regional or international response to prevent an al-Qaeda-affiliated government. However, JNIM generally lacks the capabilities to capture and control Bamako. FAMa and Africa Corps are also highly concentrated in Bamako, making any frontal assault or siege costly.  

JNIM will probably continue their economic blockades over the near-to-medium term. The longer the blockades remain in place, the more likely an attempted coup to remove Goita becomes. Disruptions to fuel and other resources will also impact FAMa operations, weakening its ability to protect the capital and respond to JNIM attacks throughout the country. Rather than trying to capture Bamako, JNIM could instead carry out a complex attack targeting the airport, key security positions, and government offices in the next three months. A successful attack would negatively impact support within the military and could also trigger a coup attempt. It is also possible that JNIM is unable to maintain the blockades for an extended period of time; instead, the group may attempt to negotiate concessions from the government before withdrawing back into rural strongholds.

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