Sudan: Gulf Engagement to Endure Even as Middle East War Escalates

• The escalating conflict in the Middle East is unlikely to materially disrupt Emirati and Saudi support to Sudan’s warring factions.

• The war in Sudan shows few viable pathways to de-escalation. Sustained external patronage and territorial consolidation leave both the SAF and RSF (Rapid Support Forces) with little incentive to negotiate.

• Prolonged conflict is the most likely trajectory in Sudan, and for the remainder of 2026, materially increases the risk of spillover into fragile neighboring states.  

Nearly three years into one of Africa's deadliest wars, fighting in Sudan shows few signs of abating. The conflict, which erupted in April 2023 from a power struggle between SAF military chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his former deputy and leader of the RSF, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), has evolved into a protracted and resource-sustained confrontation.

Both factions retain significant military capabilities and continue to fund military operations through gold revenues. The latest figures estimate death tolls of hundreds of thousands, with 12 million displaced and millions more facing acute humanitarian need.

External actors have become the decisive variable sustaining the war. Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to back rival factions for overlapping but distinct geostrategic reasons, anchoring the conflict within a broader competition for influence along the Red Sea corridor. While Saudi Arabia seeks Red Sea access to diversify energy export routes, the UAE’s interest lies in port access to secure footholds in global trade corridors.  

Emirati support has been the most consequential external driver on the battlefield, enabling RSF operations and the capture of one of Darfur’s last major urban centers. Saudi support has been more politically and economically oriented, helping sustain SAF-aligned governance structures and reinforcing the group’s legitimacy. 

Iran's escalating pressure on the Gulf states in recent weeks poses military implications for Sudan but is unlikely to displace Riyadh or Abu Dhabi’s strategic engagement with the warring factions, even as Iranian strikes intensify pressure on Saudi and Emirati homeland defense. While both states are likely to prioritize interceptor stocks and air defense infrastructure, there is little indication that either has provided the warring factions with significant defensive capabilities.

The war in the Middle East is unlikely to significantly affect financial and logistical assistance to Sudan. The UAE’s financial stake is considerable, reportedly running into hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. Both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have pursued access to Sudan’s gold deposits, estimated at 2,000 tons. Saudi Arabia's investment in Sudan is smaller than the Emirates’ but also capitalizes on gold markets. These investments underscore that Gulf engagement in Sudan is not only tactical but tied to longer-term economic positioning and resource access. Both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh are likely staking future mineral profits on their respective side’s military victory. 

External pressure from the US-Israel-Iran conflict is intensifying internal fractures within the SAF, complicating an already difficult balancing act. Iranian support, concentrated among Islamist-leaning factions, has produced internal divisions. SAF leadership is likely to maintain a cautious posture, emphasizing domestic priorities and expressing continued solidarity with Gulf states.  

Even as the Middle East conflict tests internal cohesion among some elements in Sudan, neither of the warring factions appear ready to negotiate. Moreover, territorial advances throughout 2025 have entrenched an emerging geographic split. To the East, the SAF-led administration in Port Sudan controls around two-thirds of Sudan and retains international recognition. To the West, the RSF has consolidated a parallel administration out of Nyala since August 2025, controlling the entirety of the western Darfur region.

Beyond Sudan’s borders, Iranian pressure on the UAE and Saudi Arabia has had the unintended effect of temporarily thawing Saudi-Emirati tensions. Gulf unity in response to Iranian strikes appears tactically aligned but is unlikely to override both states’ longer-term entrenched geostrategic competition. 

In the coming weeks, the war in Sudan will likely worsen. Iranian aggression against the Gulf states is highly likely to stall any diplomatic efforts elsewhere in the region. US, Saudi, Emirati, or Egyptian-led negotiation initiatives will likely be deprioritized as Gulf States redirect focus to the immediate threat. Conflict around the Strait of Hormuz may deepen the strategic importance of the Red Sea, galvanizing external competition over the Horn of Africa region.

For the remainder of 2026, a protracted Sudan conflict materially increases the risk of spillover into fragile neighboring States, including Chad, Ethiopia, CAR, and South Sudan, and will amplify vulnerabilities across security, humanitarian, and political dimensions that these states are ill-equipped to absorb over the long-term. 

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